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Abstract
We apply cooperative game theory concepts to analyze a
Holt-Modigliani-Muth-Simon (HMMS) supply chain. The bull-
whip effect in a two-stage supply chain (supplier-manufacturer)
in the framework of the HMMS-model with quadratic cost func-
tions is considered. It is assumed that both firms minimize their
relevant costs, and two cases are examined: the supplier and the
manufacturer minimize their relevant costs in a decentralized
and in a centralized (cooperative) way. The question of how to
share the savings of the decreased bullwhip effect in the central-
ized (cooperative) model is answered by the weighted Shapley
value, by a transferable utility cooperative game theory tool,
where the weights are for the exogenously given “bargaining
powers” of the participants of the supply chain.
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1 Introduction
In the supply chain literature so far mostly non-cooperative
game theory concepts were applied, see e.g. Kogan and
Tapiero [10] and Sethi at al. [14], for an exception see Dobos
and Pintér [4]. In this paper we analyze supply chains by co-
operative game theory tools. Our main question is that how
the manufacturer and the supplier should share the savings they
achieve by harmonizing their production plans. We apply the
following cooperative game theory concepts: the core (Gillies
[8]) and the weighted Shapley value (Shapley [16]) to answer
the above question. The core concept expresses that the consid-
ered allocation of the savings is stable, while the weights in the
weighted Shapley value are for the exogenously given “bargain-
ing powers” of the participants of the supply chain, that is, those
describe how the participants share the savings as a function of
their “bargaining powers”.
In order to demonstrate the efficiency of cooperating in a sup-
ply chain we consider the so called bullwhip effect. The bull-
whip effect explains the fluctuations of sales (demand), manu-
facturing and supply. The bullwhip effect was first observed by
Forrester [7], later Lee et al. [11] rediscovered this phenomenon.
They mentioned four basic causes of the bullwhip effect: lead-
times and demand signal processing, order batching, rationing
and gaming; and promotion effect, or price fluctuations. These
effects were investigated e.g. by Disney et al. [2].
There are three basic models to investigate the decision pro-
cesses of a firm: the Wagner-Whitin, Arrow-Karlin and the Holt-
Modigliani-Muth-Simon (HMMS) model. These models have a
stock-flow identity and a cost function. The difference between
them lies in the cost functions. The well-known lot sizing model
of Wagner and Whitin [17] assumes a concave cost function.
The basic model of Arrow and Karlin [1] applies a linear hold-
ing and a convex production cost function. The model of Holt,
Modigliani, Muth and Simon [9] assumes a quadratic function
for both the inventory holding and the production cost.
The main goal of this paper is to demonstrate that the Shap-
ley value (Shapley [15]), a cooperative game theory tool, can be
applied to supply chain analysis.. We consider an HMMS-type
two-stage supply chain and analyse the bullwhip effect appear-
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ing in this model. To show that because of the bullwhip effect the
cooperation of the manufacturer and the supplier induces sav-
ings, we develop two models: a decentralized and a centralized
HMMS-type supply chain model.
The decentralized model assumes that first the manufacturer
solves her production planning problem (the market demand is
given exogenously) and her ordering process is based on the op-
timal production plan. Then the supplier minimizes her costs
on the basis of the ordering of the manufacturer. In the central-
ized model it is assumed that the participants of the supply chain
cooperate, that is, they minimize the sum of their costs.
In the next step we compare the production-inventory strate-
gies and the costs of the manufacturer and supplier in the two
models to show that the bullwhip effect can be reduced by coop-
eration (centralized model). This cooperation can be defined as
a kind of information sharing between the parties of the supply
chain.
Finally, we discuss the question of how the manufacturer and
the supplier should share the savings their cooperation induces.
We assume that the “bargaining powers” of the participants are
given by weights summing up to one, and share the savings ac-
cording to these weighs. We demonstrate that, in this model
this concept coincides with the weighted Shapley value (Shap-
ley [16]) and it is stable, that is, it is in the core (Gillies [8]).
The main differences between this paper and Dobos and Pin-
tér [4] are as follows:
1 Dobos and Pintér [4] consider the Arrow-Karlin model (Ar-
row and Karlin [1]), while in this paper we analyze the Holt-
Modigliani-Muth-Simon model, so the two papers consider
different management science situations. Moreover,
2 Dobos and Pintér [4] assume that the manufacturer and the
supplier have the same “bargaining powers”, that is, none of
them can be considered as stronger than the other. In business,
however, typically one of the participants is stronger than the
other, that is, they do not have same “bargaining powers”. In
other words, it is desirable to take care about the participants’
“bargaining powers” when we discuss the allocation of the
savings achieved by the cooperation. In this paper, we apply
the weighted Shapley value, in which the weights reflect the
articipants’ different “bargaining powers”.
The paper is organized as follows. The decentralized model is
discussed in Section 2. Section 3 analyzes the centralized (co-
operative) supply chain model. In Section 4 we introduce some
concepts of cooperative game theory and define supply chain
(cooperative) games given by the models discussed in Sections
2 and 3. Moreover, we apply the above mentioned solution
concepts of transferable utility cooperative games to answer the
question of how the manufacturer and the supplier should share
the savings, the result of their cooperation. An exact number ex-
ample is given in Section 5. The last section briefly concludes.
2 The decentralized system
We consider a simple supply chain consisting of two firms: a
supplier and a manufacturer. We assume that the firms are inde-
pendent, that is, each makes her decision to minimize her own
costs. The firms have two stores: a store for raw materials and
a store for end products. Moreover, we assume that the input
stores are empty, that is, the firms can order suitable quantity
and that they can get the ordered quantity. The production pro-
cesses have a known, constant lead time. The material flow of
the model is depicted in Figure 1. The following parameters
are used in the models:
T length of the planning horizon,
S (t) the rate of demand, continuous differentiable, t ∈ [0,T ],
¯Im(t) inventory goal size of manufactured product, t ∈ [0,T ],
¯Is(t) inventory goal size of supplied product, t ∈ [0,T ],
¯Pm(t) manufacturing goal level, t ∈ [0,T ],
¯Ps(t) supply goal level, t ∈ [0,T ],
hm inventory holding cost coefficient in manufactured prod-
uct store,
hs inventory holding cost coefficient in supplied product
store,
cm production cost coefficient for manufacturing,
cs production cost coefficient for supply.
In the HMMS-model it is assumed that the management of
the (manufacturer and supplier) firms have fixed a production-
inventory pattern, that is, the production plans ¯Pm(t) and ¯Ps(t),
and planned inventory levels ¯Im(t) and ¯Is(t) are known before the
planning horizon. The objective of the managers of the firms is
to minimize the deviations from the fixed objective level. The
deviations are defined, as quadratic functionals with known pa-
rameters. This phenomenon was empirically tested by Holt,
Modigliani, Muth, and Simon [9]. The decision variables:
Im(t) the inventory level of the manufactured product, it is
non-negative, t ∈ [0,T ],
Is(t) the inventory level of the supplied product, it is non-
negative, t ∈ [0,T ],
Pm(t) the rate of manufacturing, it is non-negative, t ∈ [0,T ],
Ps(t) the rate of supply, it is non-negative, t ∈ [0,T ].
The decentralized model describes the situation where the
supplier and the manufacturer optimize independently, we mean
the manufacturer determines its optimal production-inventory
strategy first (the market demand is given exogenously), then
she orders the necessary quantity of products to meet the known
demand. Then the supplier accepts the order and minimizes her
own costs.
Next, we model the manufacturer in this HMMS-
environment. The manufacturer solves the following problem:
Jm =
T∫
0
{
hm
2
[
Im(t) − ¯Im(t)
]2
+
cm
2
[
Pm(t) − ¯Pm(t)
]2}
dt → min
(1)
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Fig. 1. Material flow in the models
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s.t.
˙Im(t) = Pm(t) − S (t), Im(0) = Im0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T (2)
Assume that the optimal production-inventory policy of the
manufacturer is
(
Idm(·), Pdm(·)
)
in model (1)-(2) and the manu-
facturer orders Pdm(·). Then the supplier solves the following
problem:
Js =
T∫
0
{
hs
2
[
Is(t) − ¯Is(t)
]2
+
cs
2
[
Ps(t) − ¯Ps(t)
]2}
dt → min
(3)
s.t.
˙Is(t) = Ps(t) − Pdm(t), Is(0) = Is0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T (4)
Notice that problem (3)-(4) has the same planning horizon [0,T ]
as that of model (1)-(2). To solve problem (1)-(2) we apply
the Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle (see e.g. Feichtinger and
Hartl, (1986), Seierstad and Sydsaeter, (1987)).
Assume that production-inventory strategy
(
Idm(·), Pdm(·)
)
is an
optimal solution for model (1)-(2). Then the optimal solution
must satisfy the following differential equation: ˙Idm(t)
˙Pdm(t)
 =  0 1hm
cm
0
 ·  Idm(t)Pdm(t)
 +  −S (t)˙
¯Pm(t) − hmcm · ˙¯Im(t)
 ,
with initial and terminal condition
Idm(0) = Im0, Pdm(T ) = ¯Pm(T ).
We do not prove this lemma, the proof can be found in Dobos
(2003). If production strategy Pdm(·) is known, then problem (3)-
(4) can be solved. For the case of positive inventory level and
production rate the optimal strategy is presented in the follow-
ing.
Let us assume that production-inventory strategy
(
Ids (·), Pds (·)
)
is an optimal solution for model (3)-(4). Then the optimal solu-
tion must satisfy the following differential equation: ˙Ids (t)
˙Pds (t)
 =  0 1hs
cs
0
 ·  Ids (t)Pds (t)
 +  −Pdm(t)˙
¯Ps(t) − hscs · ˙¯Is(t)
 ,
with initial and terminal condition
˜Ids (0) = Is0, Pds (T ) = ¯Ps(T ).
Later we use the following notations: let Jdm and Jds be the op-
timal values of cost functions (1) and (3) respectively, that is,
let
Jdm =
T∫
0
{
hm
2
[
Idm(t) − ¯Im(t)
]2
+
cm
2
[
Pdm(t) − ¯Pm(t)
]2}
dt
and
Jds =
T∫
0
{
hs
2
[
Ids (t) − ¯Is(t)
]2
+
cs
2
[
Pds (t) − ¯Ps(t)
]2}
dt.
3 The centralized system
In this section we solve the centralized model, that is, the
model, where the manufacturer and supplier coordinate their de-
cisions. The model is as follows
Jms =
T∫
0
{
hm
2
[
Im(t) − ¯Im(t)
]2
+
cm
2
[
Pm(t) − ¯Pm(t)
]2 (5)
+
hs
2
[
Is(t) − ¯Is(t)
]2
+
cs
2
[
Ps(t) − ¯Ps(t)
]2 }
dt → min
s.t.
˙Im(t) = Pm(t) − S (t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (6)
˙Is(t) = Ps(t) − Pm(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (7)Im(0)Is(0)
 = Im0Is0
 (8)
The optimal centralized production strategies for the manu-
facturer and the supplier respectively are two equations which
are called optimal linear decision rules. (See Holt-Modigliani-
Muth-Simon [9].) The necessary and sufficient conditions be-
come a system of linear differential equations:

˙Icm(t)
˙Ics (t)
˙Pcm(t)
˙Pcs(t)
 =

0 0 1 0
0 0 −1 1
hm
cm
− hs
cm
0 0
0 hs
cs
0 0
 ·

Icm(t)
Ics (t)
Pcm(t)
Pcs(t)
 +
+

−S (t)
0
˙
¯Pm(t) − hmcm ¯Im(t) + hscm ¯Is(t)
˙
¯Ps(t) − hscs ¯Is(t)

(9)
with initial and ending conditionsIcm(0)Ics (0)
 = Im0Is0
 , and Pcm(T )Pcs(T )
 =  ¯Pm(T )
¯Ps(T )
 .
Finally, consider a notation: let Jcms = Jcm + Jcs denote the optimal
value of cost function (5), where
Jcm =
T∫
0
{
hm
2
[
Icm(t) − ¯Im(t)
]2
+
cm
2
[
Pcm(t) − ¯Pm(t)
]2}
dt
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and
Jcs =
T∫
0
{
hs
2
[
Ics (t) − ¯Is(t)
]2
+
cs
2
[
Pcs(t) − ¯Ps(t)
]2}
dt.
4 The cost sharing
In this section we provide a sharing rule of the savings the
cooperation induces. It is easy to see the following result:
Lemma 1 0 ≤ Jcms = Jcm + Jcs ≤ Jdm + Jds .
This result can be interpreted as follows: The total cost of the
decentralized system, that is, the sum of the supplier’s and man-
ufacturer’s costs is higher than that of the centralized system.
The question is that now, how to share the savings induced by
the players’ cooperation.
First, we introduce the concept of transferable utility cooper-
ative games. Let N= {1, 2,. . . , n} be the nonempty, finite set of
the players. Moreover, let v : 2N → < be a function such that
v(Ø) = 0, where 2N is for the class of all subsets of N. Then v
is called transferable utility (TU) cooperative game, henceforth
game with player set N.
Game v can be interpreted as every coalition (subset of N)
has a value. E.g. S ⊆ N is a coalition consisting of the play-
ers of S , and v(S ) is the value of coalition S . The value of a
coalition can be the profit the coalition members can achieve if
they cooperate, or the cost they induce if they harmonize their
actions.
In our model there are two players: the manufacturer (m) and
the supplier (s), that is, N = {m, s}, and the value of a coalition
is the cost the coalition members induce if they coordinate their
production plans and inventory strategies.
In the decentralized model the players do not harmonize their
actions, and achieve their minimal costs independently of each
other. Therefore (see Subsection 5.1)
v({m}) = Jdm and v({s}) = J sm.
In the centralized model the manufacturer and the supplier
form a coalition, that is, they cooperate. Therefore (see Subsec-
tion 5.2)
v({m, s}) = Jcms.
Henceforth let v denote the supply chain game defined above.
To sum up the above discussion, the decentralized and the
centralized model generate a (TU cooperative) game.
To answer the question of how the players should share the
savings their cooperation induces, we apply three solution con-
cepts of cooperative game theory.
First, we introduce the concept of core (Gillies [8]). In our
model the core of supply chain game v is defined as follows:
C(v) = {x ∈ <{m,s} : xm + xs = Jcms, xm ≤ Jdm, xs ≤ Jds },
where xm and xs are coordinates belonging to the manufacturer
and the supplier respectively.
The core can be described as it consists of allocations of the
total cost of the centralized model such that none of the players
can be better off by leaving the centralized model, by stopping
cooperation, that is, the core consists of stable (robust) alloca-
tions of the costs. It is easy to see that in this model the core is
not empty, that is, there is a stable allocation of the costs.
In our model the core has the disadvantage that generally it
consists of many points, that is, it is a map-valued solution.
Therefore, the following natural question comes up: How can
we pick up only one point as a solution? Next we consider a
point-valued solution.
Let ωm, ωs ≥ 0 such that ω1 + ω2 = 1, then ωm and ωs are
called the weights of the manufacturer and the supplier respec-
tively. These weighs can be interpreted as the exogenously given
“bargaining powers” of the players.
Shapley [16] introduced the following point-valued solution
concept: The weighted Shapley value of the manufacturer and
the supplier respectively in supply chain game v
wS h(v)m = (1 − ωm)Jdm + ωm
(
Jcms − Jds
)
,
and
wS h(v)s = (1 − ωs)12 J
d
s + ωs
(
Jcms − Jdm
)
.
The weighted Shapley value can be interpreted as it is an ad-
justed (by the weights) expected value of the given player’s
marginal contribution. In other words, e.g. the manufacturer’s
weighted Shapley value is the expected value with the distribu-
tion ((1 − ωm), ωm) of the manufacturer’s marginal contribution
to the cost of the two coalitions not containing her, to the empty
collation (Jdm) and to coalition {s}(Jcms − Jds ).
In the symmetric case, when the two players have equal
power, that is, ωm = ωs = 12 , wS hm(v) and wS hs(v) are the
so called Shapley value of the manufacturer and the supplier re-
spectively in game v.
Next we show that in our model the Shapley solution is in the
core, hence it
Lemma 2 For any supply chain game v
(wS h(v)m,wS h(v)s) ∈ C (v) .
Proof. Let (ωm, ωs) be an arbitrary weight system. Take the
manufacturer first: Lemma 4 implies that
wS h(v)m = (1 − ωm)Jdm + ωm(Jcms − Jds ) ≤ (1 − ωm)Jdm + ωmJdm,
that is, wS h(v)m ≤ Jdm. In a similar way we can see that
wS h(v)s ≤ Jds .
Finally, it is obvious that wS h(v)m + wS h(v)s = Jcms (see e.g.
Shapley [16]).
5 A numerical example
Take the following parameters and cost functions in problems
(1)-(2), (3)-(4) and (5)-(8), as in Table 1.
In the following we solve the decentralized and the central-
ized problem.
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Tab. 1. Parameter specification for the example
Description Data
Length of planning horizon: T 5
Demand rates: S (t) sin(t)+2
Delay of the supply: τ 0.5
Manufacturing rate goal level: ¯Pm(·) 1.0
Supply rate goal level: ¯Ps(·) 0.85
Inventory size goal level in manufacturing store: ¯Im(·) 0.5
Inventory size goal level in supply store: ¯Is(·) 0.3
Initial inventory level in manufacturing store: Im(0) 0.25
Initial inventory level in manufacturing store: Is(0) 0.5
Manufacturing cost coefficient: cm 1.0
Supply cost coefficient: cs 0.5
Inventory holding cost coefficient in manufacturing store: hm 2
Inventory holding cost coefficient in supply store: hs 1
5.1 The solution of the decentralized problem
The decentralized problem is a hierarchical production plan-
ning problem. First the manufacturer solves her planning prob-
lem, then the optimal ordering policy is forwarded to the sup-
plier. Finally, the supplier optimizes her own relevant costs
based on the known ordering policy of the manufacturer.
The problem of the manufacturer is as follows:
Jm =
5∫
0
{
2
2
[Im(t) − 0.5]2 + 12 [Pm(t) − 1]
2
}
dt → min
s.t.
˙Im(t) = Pm(t) − sin(t) − 2, Im(0) = 0.25, 0 ≤ t ≤ 5
The optimal solution can be determined with help of Lemma
2, because the optimal inventory level and production rate are
positive. Let the optimal the optimal solution be functions Pdm(·)
and Idm(·).
The minimal cost of the manufacturer is 4.604 units, that is,
Jdm = 4.604.
In the next step we solve the problem of the supplier, where
the manufacturer’s ordering policy Pdm(·) is given:
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Fig. 2. Optimal manufacturing and supply rates for the decentralized models
Js =
5∫
0
{
1
2
[Is(t) − 0.3]2 + 0.52 [Ps(t) − 0.85]
2
}
dt → min
s.t.
˙Is(t) = Ps(t) − Pdm(t), Is(0) = 0.5, 0 ≤ t ≤ 5
The optimal solution for the supplier is functions Pds (·) and Ids (·),
applying the results of Lemma 4.
The optimal production rates and inventory levels are shown
in Figures 2 and 3.
The minimal cost of the supplier is 2.335 units, that is, Jds =
2.335. The total cost of manufacturer and supplier is 6.939 units
in this decentralized strategy of the supply chain, that is Jdm +
Jds = 6.939.
5.2 The solution of the centralized problem
In the following we solve the centralized problem:
Jms =
5∫
0
{
2
2
[Im(t) − 0.5]2 + 12 [Pm(t) − 1]
2 +
1
2
[Is(t) − 0.3]2
+
0.5
2
[Ps(t) − 0.85]2
}
dt → min
s.t.
˙Im(t) = Pm(t) − sin(t) − 2, 0 ≤ t ≤ 5
˙Is(t) = Ps(t) − Pm(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ 5Im(0)Is(0)
 = 0.250.5

The optimal solution of this problem is given after the solu-
tion of the following differential equation (see (9)):
˙Icm(t)
˙Ics (t)
˙Pcm(t)
˙Pcs(t)
 =

0 0 1 0
0 0 −1 1
2 −1 0 0
0 2 0 0
 ·

Icm(t)
Ics (t)
Pcm(t)
Pcs(t)
 +

− sin(t) − 2
0
−0.7
−0.6
 (10)
with initial and terminal conditionsIm(0)Is(0)
 = 0.250.5
 , and Pcm(T )Pcs(T )
 =  10.85
 .
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Fig. 3. Optimal manufacturing and supply inventory levels for the decentral-
ized models
The optimal production rates and inventory levels are shown in
Figures 4 and 5. The minimal cost of the centralized system is
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Fig. 4. Optimal manufacturing and supply rates for the centralized model
6.887 units, where the manufacturer’s cost is 4.656 units and the
supplier’s cost is 2.231 units, that is, Jcms = 6.887, Jcm = 4.656
and Jcs = 2.231.
5.3 Comparison of the solutions of the decentralized and
the centralized system
First, compare the production rate and inventory level of the
manufacturer and the supplier in the cases of the decentralized
and the centralized system, where Imdt, Imct, Isdt and Isct are
for the inventory level for the manufacturer and for the supplier
in the decentralized and the centralized model respectively. In
this example the inventory level of the manufacturer decreases
in the case of cooperation, that is, in the centralized system. The
inventory level of the supplier first decreases, and then increases
when the participants cooperate in the supply chain, see Fig-
ures 6 and 7. As we see, the production level in the centralized
system is smoother, that is, the growth of the production rate is
smaller than that in the case of the decentralized system, and the
contrary is true for the supplier, that is, in the decentralized sys-
tem the production rate of the supplier is smoother than that in
the centralized system, where Pmdt, Pmct, Psdt and Psct are for
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Fig. 5. Optimal manufacturing and supply inventory levels for the central-
ized model
the production level for the manufacturer and for the supplier in
the decentralized and the centralized models respectively, and
S(t) is for the exogenously given demand, see Figures 8 and 5.
This phenomenon is the decreased bullwhip effect in the cen-
tralized model. The optimal costs of the decentralized and the
centralized problem are presented in Table 2. As we have seen,
Tab. 2. The optimal costs of the example
Decentralized problem Centralized problem
Manufacturer costs (Jm) 4.604 4.656
Supplier costs (Js) 2.335 2.231
Total costs (Jms) 6.939 6.887
the total cost of the centralized problem is lower than that of
the decentralized one. The cost reduction is approximately 1%.
In the centralized problem the manufacturer cost increases with
more than 1% an the supplier cost decreases with 4.5%.
After the above analysis the question of how to share the sav-
ings, the cooperation of the participants in the supply chain in-
duces, comes on stage.
Fig. 6. The inventory level of the manufacturer in the decentralized and the
centralized system
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Fig. 7. The inventory level of the supplier in the decentralized and the cen-
tralized system
5.4 Cost sharing
Before we introduce the weighted Shapley value, we show
graphically the core C(v)of the supply chain game. The core of
our problem is defined, as
C(v) = {x ∈ <{m,s} : xm + xs = 6.887, xm ≤ 4.604, xs ≤ 2.335}.
Using the results from Table 2, Figure 10 presents the core of
our supply chain game with a thick black line.
Assume the manufacturer’s “bargaining power” is two times
of the supplier’s, that is,ωm = 23 andωs =
1
3 . The weighed Shap-
ley value of the manufacturer and the supplier are wS hm(v) =
4.57 and wS hs(v) = 2.317 respectively. It means that the play-
ers share their savings equally. The weighted Shapley value
is shown in Figure 10, it is the (ωm, ωs)-weighted average of
the two endpoints of the core, that is, (wS hm(v),wS hs(v)) =
ωm(Jcms−Jds , Jds )+ωs(Jdm, Jcms−Jdm). Notice that, since the cooper-
ation does not allocate the savings according to the exogenously
given weights, a transfer between the supplier and the manufac-
turer is needed. As a result of cooperation the manufacturer cost
increase and the supplier’s cost decrease, that is, all the savings
go to the supplier. In order to reach the allocation, the parties
agree on, that is, the weighted Shapley value a transfer is: the
supplier must transfer 0.086 units to the manufacturer. It means
Fig. 8. The production rate of the manufacturer in the decentralized and the
centralized system
Fig. 9. The production rate of manufacturer in the decentralized and the cen-
tralized system
Fig. 10. The core
that the manufacturer and the supplier agree on a contract such
that the parties commit themselves to cooperate and the sup-
plier commits herself to pay 0.086 units to the manufacturer as
a ”price” for his cooperation.
6 Conclusion and further research
In this paper we have solved two two-stage HMMS-type sup-
ply chain models: a decentralized and a centralized model. We
have showed that the cooperation of the two players induces sav-
ings in costs.
In the next step we have considered sharing rules for the sav-
ings. We have applied cooperative game theory solution con-
cepts to this problem, and we have introduced the concept of
supply chain games. It was shown that in the two player supply
chain games the core is not empty and that the weighted Shapley
value is always in the core.
As an illustration for our results we have presented an exact
number example. In this example the supplier’s cost of adaption
in production to the fluctuations in the orderings of the manu-
facturer is higher than that of the manufacturer. Moreover, the
production costs are dominant over the inventory costs. There-
fore it is not surprising at all that in the centralized model the
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supplier has reduced her inventory level, and the manufacturer’s
inventory level is higher than that in the decentralized model,
and vice versa for the supplier.
The reason of this fact is that the manufacturer minimizes her
relevant cost in the decentralized model, so that her production
level is near to the demand rate. After cooperation the manufac-
turer gives up to follow her cost optimal production strategy to
allow the supplier to reduce her own production-inventory cost
implying a decrease in the total cost of the supply chain as well,
since the supplier’s cost saving balances out the increase of the
manufacturer’s cost.
This phenomenon points at the well known bullwhip effect
of supply chains in a way: the supplier decreased the inventory
level after information sharing (cooperation), and she adjusted
her production rate closer to the demand rate.
In this type supply chains the two players might have asym-
metrical roles. It can happen that the manufacturer has much
stronger bargaining position than that of the supplier or vice
versa. To consider the asymmetric bargaining positions we ap-
ply the weighted Shapley value as solution concept for sharing
the savings among the parties. The weights are for the supply
chain participants’ “bargaining powers”, the bigger the weight,
the stronger the given party’s “bargaining power”.
The managerial implication of the model is that the total costs
are lower in a supplier-buyer relationship in case of cooperation.
The costs of the buyer increase after cooperation which can be
financed with a side payment. A side payment is controlled by
a contract. In this paper we have avoided to investigate the sup-
ply contracts. The basis of the cooperation can be the above
mentioned supply contracts, but another tool is the information
sharing. In case of information sharing the paricipants of the
supply chain share either cost or demand information. In our
model we have examined only the information sharing of pro-
duction plans.
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